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It has been known for a long time that Buddhism and Jainism (the latter in the form 
preached by Mahåv¥ra) originated more or less at the same time and in the same region 
of India. The early Buddhist texts in particular describe various encounters between the 
Buddha and Jainas (called nirgrantha/nigaˆ†ha in these texts), they know Mahåv¥ra 
(Nigaˆ†ha Nåt(h)aputta) and report his death.1 It is not therefore surprising that Jainism 
has exerted an influence on Buddhism in its early phases.2 The question whether and to 
what extent Buddhism has influenced Jainism has not so far received much attention.3 
This question will be addressed in this paper. 
 We begin with a passage in SËyaga∂a I, one of the oldest canonical texts of the 
Ívetåmbara Jainas,4 which shows familiarity with Buddhism. SËyaga∂a I.1.1.17 speaks 
of the five Buddhist groups (skandha) which join up for a moment (khaˆa-joi = 
k∑aˆayogin).5 This passage clearly is not just acquainted with the early Buddhist notion 
of the five skandhas, it also knows the much more recent theory of momentariness. The 
chronological and other implications of this fact deserve attention. 
 Momentariness did not characterize Buddhism from its beginning. The earliest 
clear references to it appear to occur in the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å of the Sarvåstivåda 
tradition, composed several centuries after the beginning of the common era.6 This does 
not necessarily imply that it did not exist before that date. Indeed, it seems likely that 
the theory of momentariness finds expression in the so-called saµsk®talak∑aˆas of the 
Pañcavastuka,7 which may go back to the middle of the second century before our era.8 
The above-cited passage from the SËyaga∂a must date from that period at the earliest.9 
 This is not the only conclusion we can draw. Momentariness appears to be 
indissociably linked to the systematization of Buddhist doctrine carried out [14] in 
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Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma, and to the development of the Pañcavastuka in particular. 
Acquaintance of SËyaga∂a I with Buddhist momentariness must therefore mean: 
acquaintance with Sarvåstivåda or related Abhidharma. It will be useful to recall some 
fundamental features of this important development in Buddhism. 
 The doctrine of momentariness is but one aspect of the general analytical 
approach that characterizes this form of Buddhism. Not only was time divided into its 
ultimate units, the same was done with regard to the world in general. Its ultimate 
constituents are the dharmas, fully enumerated and extensively discussed in the texts. 
And just as time is nothing beyond a succession of moments, composite objects are 
nothing beyond the dharmas they are constituted of. In the end only momentary 
dharmas really exist; the objects they may constitute do not really exist. The composite 
object par excellence is the person, often called pudgala: Its existence is denied by 
many Buddhists for this very reason. 
 When we now return to the Jaina canonical texts that are younger than the 
SËyaga∂a, we are struck by their familiarity with the notion of a shortest unit of time. 
The moment (samaya) as the smallest unit of time appears to occur for the first time in 
the Uttarajjhayaˆa. It occurs in this sense in the late 36th chapter,10 probably in chapter 
34 which is also known to be late,11 and in chapter 29.12 Utt 36.9 speaks of time as a 
succession (santaï / Skt. santati),13 an idea and expression familiar from the Buddhist 
texts that accept momentariness. The idea that one thought occupies one moment is 
perhaps for the first time met with in Èhåˆa 1.14 This same chapter enumerates samaya, 
pradeßa (the smallest unit of space) and paramåˆu (atom) and states that they are 
single.15 These three are characterized as indivisible, indestructable etc. in chapter 3.16 
The same is said in Viyåhapannatti 5.8, where it is shown "that the atom 
(paramåˆupoggala) and the objects (poggala) that occupy one unit of space (ega-
paes'ogå∂ha), last one unit of time (ega-samaya-†hi¥ya) and possess one degree of one 
property resp. prove to be indivisible from the ... points of view [of substance, place, 
time and condition]".17 
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 Rospatt has pointed out that in Jainism the moment (samaya) is sometimes 
defined as the time taken for the movement from one spatial point to the next.18 This 
specification of the moment's dimension, he continues, can also be found in Buddhism 
(where the moment is called k∑aˆa), but has there most [15] probably been adopted 
from Jainism. He argues that this determination of the moment fits better into the 
context of Jainism than in that of Buddhism, because it presupposes that empty space is 
subdivided into spatial atoms. This is indeed the Jainas' point of view, but not that of 
the Buddhists (with some exceptions pointed out by Rospatt). He further emphasizes 
that the specification of the moment's duration by movement is at odds with the 
Buddhist theory of momentariness according to which all conditioned things exist for 
too short a time to allow for any movement at all. Rospatt's argument is convincing and 
makes it probable that this particular way of defining the moment, and of linking up 
samaya and pradeßa, belonged to Jainism before they found their way into Buddhism. It 
has however no bearing on the question which of these two currents of thought 
developed the notion of a minimal unit of time first. This last question is answered by 
the acquaintance of the SËyaga∂a with the Buddhist theory of momentariness, well 
before the idea of moments had been introduced into Jainism.19 It seems plausible to 
assume that Jainism borrowed this idea from Buddhist Abhidharma. 
 
 The second half of the verse from the SËyaga∂a which shows familiarity with 
the Buddhist notion of skandhas and the theory of momentariness, studied above, has 
not received the attention it deserves. It betrays acquaintance with the Buddhist concept 
of the person. It reads, in Bollée's slightly adjusted translation:20 "[Die Seele] ist weder 
verschieden, noch — so lehren sie — nicht verschieden [von den skandhas], wohl und 
nicht aus einer Ursache entstanden." Bollée is no doubt correct — as was, before him, 
Jacobi;21 both follow in this respect Í¥lå∫ka — in thinking that this half of the verse 
concerns the soul, or the person, of the Buddhists. We can be more precise: the 
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characterisation of the soul/person as neither identical with nor different from the 
skandhas agrees in all details with what we know about the Buddhist Pudgalavådins. 
 Recall that Buddhism, as pointed out above, developed a concept of the person 
conceived of as a collection of skandhas which, because it is such a collection and 
therefore a composite entity, was not recognized to exist. No composite entities were 
considered to exist by these Buddhists, and the rejection of the person was but one 
example, even though the most significant one, of this attitude. Other Buddhists, the so-
called Pudgalavådins, disagreed. [16] They did not reject the existence of the person, 
even though they, too, appear to have looked upon it as a collection of skandhas. Yet 
they believed that the person does not disappear when the skandhas disappear. They 
maintained that the person is neither identical with nor different from the skandhas.22 
This, as we have seen, is the conception of the person which the SËyaga∂a attributes to 
the Buddhists. 
 The chronological and other consequences of this fact, too, will have to be 
considered. The Våts¥putr¥yas, who represent the earliest form of Pudgalavåda, are 
supposed to have separated themselves from other Buddhists after a schism which took 
place some two hundred years after the death of the Buddha.23 This is not in conflict 
with our earlier conclusion, according to which this verse of the SËyaga∂a must have 
been composed after the middle of the second century B.C.E. 
 The acquaintance of the SËyaga∂a with the Buddhist concept of the person, and 
therefore with Buddhist ideas relating to composite entities, raises various questions. 
The first one concerns the subsequent Jaina attitude with regard to composite objects. 
Did the Jainas undergo Abhidharma influence in this respect? We have seen that the 
Sarvåstivådins rejected the existence of composite entities. What is the position of the 
later Jaina canonical texts with regard to this for the Buddhists important issue? Several 
passages show that they are aware of the distinction between composite entities and 
their parts, and that they accept the existence of both. 
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 Uttarajjhayaˆa chapter 36 accepts the existence of wholes in v. 11:24 
"Compound things and atoms occur as individual things and apart (or different) [from 
each other]" (egatteˆa puhatteˆa khandhå ya paramåˆuˆo). The Viyåhapannatti speaks 
repeatedly of aggregates (khandha) as existing things;25 aggregates are formed when 
atoms are united into one (egayao såhaˆˆaµti = ekata˙ saµhanyante).26 Elsewhere 
the same text states that "aggregates occupying two space-units (dupaesiya khandha) ... 
[1] possess [dialectical] reality if they are considered from the point of view of their 
own [properties] ..., [2] do not possess that reality if they are considered from the point 
of view of [the properties] of another object ...; [3] one cannot say that they possess or 
do not possess reality if they are considered simultaneously from both these points of 
view ... [4] the aggregate simultaneously possesses and does not possess reality if part 
of it is considered from the point of view of its inherent [17] properties and the other 
part from the point of view of alien properties; and, in conditions the reader can easily 
deduce for himself, [5] the aggregate simultaneously possesses reality and one cannot 
say that it possesses or does not possess reality; or [6] it simultaneously does not 
possess reality and one cannot say etc." and similar things about larger aggregates.27 All 
these passages show that they were composed at a time when the philosophical issue of 
whether or not an aggregate exists besides its component parts was felt and discussed in 
Jainism. Since this issue is closely connected with the development of the Buddhist 
Abhidharma theory, there is a certain plausibility in the assumption that the Jainas had 
taken over this question from the Buddhists and then gave a diagonally opposite answer 
to it. 
 An important further argument supporting the idea that the Jainas were 
influenced by the Buddhist notion of the person as a composite entity is their peculiar 
use of the word pudgala.28 This is the word which the Buddhists used to refer to the 
person conceived of in that manner. The Jainas came to use it in the sense of "material 
object (including atoms)" (MW). How did they arrive at this peculiar meaning? 
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 Note to begin with that pudgala (Pkt. puggala / poggala) does not always have 
this sense in the oldest Jaina canonical texts. The SËyaga∂a has the following verse:29 
paˆˆåmadaµ ceva tavomadaµ ca ˆiˆˆåme goyamadaµ ca bhikkhË/ åj¥vagaµ ceva 
caüttham åhu se paµ∂ie uttamapoggale se//. Jacobi translates:30 "A monk should 
combat pride of genius, pride of sanctity, pride of birth, and (pride of good) living, 
which is enumerated as the fourth; such a man is wise and of the right stuff." The 
phrase uttamapoggale se is, no doubt in an effort to stick to the meaning ‘material 
object’ for poggala, translated as "[he is] of the right stuff". But obviously the 
translation "he is the best person" is to be preferred.31 This shows that the meaning 
‘person’ was not yet lost at this early period. 
 We know that the Sarvåstivåda and Pudgalavåda Buddhists looked upon both 
the person and other macroscopic objects as aggregates, but that they used the word 
pudgala only for the aggregate which is the person, not for other aggregates. Yet the 
Sarvåstivådins in particular had a tendency to treat all aggregates in the same manner: 
they denied the existence of all of them. In some of the early Jaina texts we find the 
word pudgala used for aggregates other than the person. Consider the following passage 
from Óyåra II:32 abhikaµkhasi [18] me dåuµ jåvaïyaµ, tåvaïyam poggalaµ dalayåhi, 
må a††hiyåïµ. Jacobi translates (p. 115): "if you want to give me a portion of whatever 
size, give it me; but not the bones", and this is no doubt correct. Poggala here means 
‘portion, quantity’ and refers therefore to a composite entity, an aggregate (of meat, in 
this case). 
 All other passages in the Óyåra33 and SËyaga∂a that use the word puggala / 
poggala are ambiguous as to its precise meaning. Yet the above two passages show that 
a development of the meaning from ‘person’ to ‘material object’ is conceivable if we 
take as point of departure the Buddhist use of pudgala. Passages in later canonical Jaina 
texts show that pudgala (or its Prakrit equivalents) went on referring to macroscopic 
material objects, and therefore to aggregates, besides acquiring the meaning ‘material 
atom’, sometimes called paramåˆupoggala. Èhåˆa 2 recognizes, for example, two 
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sources for the production of sound, the second of which is breaking poggalas;34 no 
need to explain that atoms cannot be broken. Viy 5.8 uses the word for both atoms and 
aggregates. It here states that "Objects (poggala, JB) ... are either divisible (sa-paesa), 
indivisible (a-p.) or infinite (aˆanta). Moreover, ... they may be at the same time 
[indivisible] from one and [divisible] (or [indivisible]) from another point of view. 
There is, however, one restriction: poggalas that are [indivisible] as to substance (scil. 
atoms) always are [indivisible] as to place, and poggalas that are [divisible] as to place 
always are [divisible] as to substance (scil. aggregates)."35 The Èhåˆa refers to the same 
distinction where it states that there are two kinds of pudgalas, the atomic and the non-
atomic, the subtle and the coarse ones.36 We must assume that the semantic 
development has passed through the following phases: ‘bodily aggregate’ ’ ‘material 
aggregate in general’ ’ ‘material object / matter’ ’ ‘the ultimate constituent of matter, 
material atom’. The end point of this development (which never replaced the preceding 
element) is, ironically, the exact opposite of its beginning, because atoms are precisely 
not aggregates. 
 
 At this point we must address a particularly important question: has the classical 
Jaina concept of the soul been created under the influence of Buddhist Abhidharma? 
 Note to begin with that the texts that are, mainly on linguistic and metrical 
grounds, looked upon as the oldest ones of the canon — primarily the [19] Óyåra and 
the SËyaga∂a — contain little information about the soul. Dalsukh D. Malvania rightly 
pointed out that "[f]rom the very first sentences of the Ócårå∫ga it is clear that the 
migration of the soul is accepted".37 He draws in this connection also attention to Óyåra 
176, which describes the soul in the following terms:38 "It is not long nor small nor 
round nor triangular nor quadrangular nor circular; it is not black nor blue nor red nor 
green nor white; neither of good nor bad smell; not bitter nor pungent nor astringent nor 
sweet; neither rough nor soft; neither heavy nor light; neither cold nor hot; neither harsh 
nor smooth. It does not have a body, is not born again, has no attachment and is without 
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sexual gender. While having knowledge and sentience, there is nonetheless nothing 
with which it can be compared. Its being is without form, there is no condition of the 
unconditioned. It is not sound nor form nor smell nor flavour nor touch or anything like 
that."39 Citing the phrase "neither long nor short" (se ˆa d¥he ˆa hrasse), Malvania 
comments: "this goes against the Jaina theory, found in the later texts, that the soul is 
the size of the body in its mundane existence, and occupies, when liberated, two thirds 
of the extent of the last body".40 This ancient concept of the soul, be it noted, was 
apparently still held at the time of SËyaga∂a II, for it is there criticized by others, who 
maintain that body and soul are identical, as characterizing the position of those who 
believe that body and soul are different. The passage is important enough to be cited at 
some length:41 "‘Those who maintain that the soul is different from the body, cannot 
tell whether the soul (as separated from the body) is long or small, whether globular or 
circular or triangular or square or sexagonal or octagonal or long, whether black or blue 
or red or yellow or white, whether of sweet smell or of bad smell, whether bitter or 
pungent or astringent or sour or sweet, whether hard or soft or heavy or light or cold or 
hot or smooth or rough.’ ... Thus I have treated of the first man (as one who believes 
that) soul and body are one and the same thing." 
 Malvania and following him Paul Dundas are of the opinion that the soul at that 
early period was defined under the influence of the Upani∑ads, and Malvania cites in 
support of this view Óyåra 171:42 "That which is the soul is that which knows, that 
which is the knower is the soul, that by which one knows is the soul." This opinion may 
or may not be correct. Malvania certainly appears to be right in suggesting that much of 
what came to be known as Jaina philosophy was developed later, and was not created in 
the [20] days of Mahåv¥ra. This looks like a plausible assumption, all the more so since 
we know that something quite similar happened in the case of Buddhism: much of what 
came to be known as Buddhist philosophy was created long after the Buddha. It does 
however raise the question how and why new ideas were developed after the time of 
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Mahåv¥ra. We will consider the somewhat more recent, but still canonical, Jaina 
conception of the soul in some detail. 
 The notion of a body-sized soul may for the first time43 be presented as an 
orthodox position in a verse of Uttarajjhayaˆa chapter 36 which states:44 "The 
dimension of perfected [souls] is two-thirds of the height which the individual had in 
his last existence". Since this verse occurs in a section dealing with various kinds of 
souls (j¥va; vv. 47-48), we must assume that "the height which the individual had in his 
last existence" also belonged to his soul. The Viyåhapannatti is more elaborate: soul 
(j¥va) and matter (poggala) are tied to each other, touched by each other, etc.45 Viy 7.8, 
referring to the Råyapaseˆaïjja,46 compares the soul, which may cover the volume of an 
elephant or of a louse, with a lamp that lights up the space in which it is placed, 
sometimes a hut, sometimes the space determined by a cover.47 A short reference to the 
body-like size of the soul is also found in one of the concluding stanzas of the 
Uvavåiya.48 
 The Jaina notion of a body-sized soul is far from identical with the Buddhist 
concept of a person as a composite entity consisting of the five skandhas, yet they have 
one important point in common: both have a spatial extension that coincides with that 
of the physical body. In the case of the Buddhist pudgala this does not cause surprise, 
for that is how it is conceived. The body-like size of the Jaina soul is more puzzling. It 
cannot be explained as being "primitive"; anthropological literature provides many 
examples of concepts of a soul that is far smaller than the body, but few, if any, of souls 
that are coextensive with it.49 Moreover, we have seen that early Jainism appears not to 
have held such a concept of the soul. The classical concept is therefore in need of 
explanation, and the fact that the Jaina soul comes to have the same size as the Buddhist 
pudgala, combined with the fact that the Jainas are known to have been acquainted with 
this latter concept, invites the conclusion that the Buddhist concept has influenced the 
classical Jaina one. 
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 It is however obvious that the Jainas cannot simply have borrowed the Buddhist 
concept of the person. The Buddhist pudgala did not become the [21] Jaina soul. 
Jainism has maintained right from the beginning that there is a soul that transmigrates, 
and that is therefore presumably different from the body. Accepting the existence of 
aggregates, even such as unite bodily and psychological factors, would not be enough 
for the Jainas to account for the soul. Indeed, by insisting that there is a soul besides the 
bodily aggregate, what was left for the latter was nothing but being a material 
aggregate, with all the consequences which we have seen for the word pudgala. Yet it 
can be argued that in an important way the Jaina soul was, in spite of this, modeled on 
the Buddhist concept of the pudgala. 
 The notion of a body-sized soul owed no doubt part of its attraction to the 
convenient way it allowed to visualize its relationship to karma. Note first, as already 
pointed out by K.K. Dixit, that Óyåra I and SËyaga∂a I — presumably the oldest texts 
of the Jaina canon — do not tell us "how the Karmic physical particles get attached to a 
soul and how they get loose from it".50 Dixit continues: "As a matter of fact, on this 
question our texts hardly say a thing that would not be endorsed by the Brahmin or 
Buddhist theoreticians." Is seems indeed likely that the classical karma doctrine of 
Jainism, which conceives of karma as atomic particles, is a later innovation, which may 
have come into being at the same time as that of the atomic nature of time and space, 
and that of the body-sized soul. Uttarajjhayaˆa chapter 33 may contain the earliest 
mention of karma as being atomic (provided Jacobi is right in translating paesagga = 
pradeßågra as ‘number of atoms’).51 
 The expression "karma body" occurs already in Óyåra I, but it is doubtful 
whether it has here the technical meaning it acquires later.52 Later canonical texts 
distinguish five kinds of bodies, among them the karma body, without giving much 
information as to their nature.53 Schubring observes:54 "The established list leading 
from orål[iya (earthly)] over veuvv[iya (of transformation)], åhår[aga (of 
transposition)], tey[aga (fiery)] to kamm[aga] sar¥ra suggests the gradual increase in 
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fineness and, simultaneously, in density of material units". The karma body may 
therefore be the finest of the five. More important for our present purposes is that living 
beings — specified are hell-beings, elementary beings and animals, human beings, and 
gods and goddesses — attract particles to build their bodies. Deleu summarises in the 
following words the way the Viyåhapannatti describes the formation of the body:55 
"The discussion starts with the paoga-bandha (junction effected by an impulse, JB) of 
[22] the earthly body (specification for the different kinds of beings). Each of these 
bandhas arises with the appearance (udaya) of the karman of the same name. ... The 
same questions regarding the bodies of transformation and transposition, the fiery body 
and the karmic body." This means, as becomes clear from the text, that the junction that 
gives rise to the earthly body arises with the appearance of the karma called 
oråliyasar¥rappaoga (oråliyasar¥rappaogaˆåmakamma), and similarly for the other 
junctions. The particles concerned are attracted by the soul, and fill up the space it 
occupies.56 
 The net result of this way of conceptualising soul and body (or rather: bodies) 
combined is much closer to the Buddhist notion of the pudgala than the Jaina concept 
of the soul by itself. All functions, both bodily and mental/spiritual, are in this way 
united in the space of the body, as they are in the case of the Buddhist pudgala.  
 
The assumption that the Jainas adopted their body-sized soul and the existence of 
aggregates in response and opposition to Buddhist Abhidharma has the advantage of 
explaining why they accepted these beliefs, and why they accepted both of them 
together. We have already seen that chronology constitutes no obstacle to this 
assumption. The Buddhist theory of momentariness, which may not have come into 
existence before the second century B.C.E., is already known to the SËyaga∂a, as is the 
notion of the Buddhist pudgala. The Buddhist theory of momentariness was but one 
aspect of the tendency, which initially may have been strongest in the Sarvåstivåda 
school, to reject the existence of all composite objects, whether extended in space or in 
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time. The Buddhist notion of the person as a composite entity dates at least from that 
same period, and therefore pre-dates, as far as we can tell, the Jaina notion of a body-
sized soul. 
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contains Sanskrit and Hindi translations.) 
Uttarajjhayaˆa / Uttarajhåyå (Uttarådhyayana SËtra). 1) The UttarådhyayanasËtra. An 
introduction, text, critical notes and a commentary, by Jarl Charpentier, 1914; 
reprint New Delhi: Ajay Book Service, 1980. 2) Nava Suttåˆi V, ed. Yuvåcårya 
Mahåprajña, Ladnun: Jain Vishva Bharati, 1987. 3) Dasaveyåliyasutta◊, 
Uttarajhayaˆåi◊ and Óvassayasutta◊, ed. Muni Puˆyavijayaji and Pt. Amritlål 
Mohanlål Bhojak, Bombay: Shri Mahåv¥ra Jaina [24] Vidyålaya, 1977 (Jaina-
Ógama-Series No. 15). 
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Uvavåiya (= Aupapåtika SËtra). 1) Das Aupapâtika Sûtra, erstes Upânga der Jaina, I. 
Theil, Einleitung, Text und Glossar, von Ernst Leumann, Leipzig 1883, repr. 
Kraus Reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966. 
Viyåhapannatti (= Vyåkhyåprajñapti). 1) Bhagava¥ Viåhapaˆˆatt¥, ed. Muni Nathamal, 
Ladnun: Jain Viswa Bhårati, V.S. 2031 (Anga Suttåni, 2). 2) 
Viyåhapaˆˆattisutta◊, ed. Bechardas J. Doshi and Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak, 
Bombay: Shr¥ Mahåv¥ra Jaina Vidyålaya, 1974-1982, 3 parts (Jaina-Ógama-
Series, 4). 3) Bhagavat¥ SËtra, Prakrit text with English translation and notes 
based on the commentary of Abhayadeva SËri, by K.C. Lalwani 4 vols. (Íatakas 
1-11), Calcutta: Jain Bhawan, 1973-1985. 
 
Notes: 
 
* I thank Paul Dundas for comments and encouragement. The following abbreviations 
are used in this article: 
AAWL  Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der 
Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse 
ANISt Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien, Hamburg 
AS Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern 
B Bombay edition 
Bareau, SBPV André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Saigon 
1955 (PEFEO 38) 
BORI Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 
C ed. Charpentier 
D Delhi edition 
DPPN G. P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, 2 vols., 
London 1937-1938 
IAMD An Illustrated Ardha-Magadhi Dictionary, by Shatavadhani Jain 
Muni and Shri Ratnachandraji Maharaj, 5 vols., Indore 1923 
(reprint, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988) 
J tr. Jacobi 
Jg. Jahrgang 
Ka†hUp Ka†ha Upani∑ad 
L Ladnun edition 
Lalw ed. tr. Lalwani 
Mahå-bh Patañjali, (Vyåkaraˆa-)Mahåbhå∑ya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 
1880-1885 
[25] 
Mhbh Mahåbhårata, crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar et al., Poona 1933 ff. 
(BORI) 
MW Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford 
1899 
P. Påˆinian sËtra 
PEFEO Publications de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris 
Pkt. Prakrit 
PTS Pali Text Society, London 
S ed. Schubring 
Sam Samavåya 
Skt. Sanskrit 
SSAI Schriftenreihe des Südasien-Instituts der Universität Heidelberg, 
Wiesbaden, Stuttgart 
StII Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 
SËy SËyaga∂a 
ÍAßUp Ívetåßvatara Upanißad 
Utt Uttarajjhayaˆa / Uttarajjhåyå 
Viy Viyåhapannatti 
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vt. Vårttika 
 
1 DPPN s.v. Nigaˆ†ha-Nåta(Nåtha-)-putta and Nigaˆ†hå. 
2 See, e.g., Johannes Bronkhorst, The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India, 
second edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1993, p. 78 f., where the influence of Jaina-
like practices and ideas is described. 
3 This question is to be distinguished from the one about common elements in the two 
traditions, which receives a fair amount of attention in the secondary literature. 
4 Cp. Hermann Jacobi, Jaina SËtras, translated from the Pråkrit, Part I: Ócårå∫ga SËtra, 
Kalpa SËtra, Oxford University Press, 1884 (reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1980) 
p. xli f.; Walther Schubring, The Doctrine of the Jainas, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 
1962, reprint 1978 (Translation by Wolfgang Beurlen of Die Lehre der Jainas, Berlin 
and Leipzig 1934) § 42 p. 81. 
5 The passage reads: paµca khaµdhe vayaµtege bålå u khaˆajo(g)iˆo. Willem B. 
Bollée (Studien zum SËyaga∂a. Die Jainas und die anderen Weltanschauungen vor der 
Zeitenwende. Textteile, Nijjutti, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Franz Steiner, 
Wiesbaden, 1977 (SSAI, 24)) translates (p. 72): "Einige, Toren, reden von fünf 
Komplexen (skandhas), die sich nur einen Moment lang verbinden." Walther Schubring 
(Worte Mahåv¥ras. Kritische Übersetzungen aus dem Kanon der Jaina, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1926) had translated the same passage [26] as follows (p. 123): 
"Fünf Elemente des Seins nennen Einige, Toren, die eine Kette von Augenblicken 
behaupten." Í¥lå∫ka proposes a third interpretation for khaˆa-joi: which exist for but 
one moment; he paraphrases (p. 17): te skandhå˙ ... k∑aˆayogina˙, 
k∑aˆamåtråvasthåyina ity artha˙. 
6 Alexander von Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. A survey of the 
origins and early phase of this doctrine up to Vasubandhu, Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, 
1995 (ANISt, 47), p. 15 f. 
7 Johannes Bronkhorst, review of Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness, 
AS 49(2), 1995, pp. 513-519. 
8 Johannes Bronkhorst, "Die Buddhistische Lehre," Peter Antes (ed.), Der indische 
Buddhismus und seine Verzweigungen (Die Religionen der Menschheit, vol. 24,1) W. 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1998(?), pp. ???-???, esp. p. ??? 
9 W.B. Bollée ("Buddhists and Buddhism in the earlier literature of the Ívetåmbara 
Jains," Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner, D. Reidel, Dordrecht - Boston, 
1974, pp. 27-39), too, is of the opinion that “the early contacts of the Jains must have 
mainly been with that current of interpretation which was represented by the 
Sarvåstivådins” (p. 28); see below. 
10 Utt 36.14-15 (C p. 250) / 36.13-14 (L p. 227) / 36.1465-66 (B p. 297-98). Since 
references to Jaina canonical texts are often hard to trace for non-specialists, I will 
regularly give references to all the editions (and occasionally translations and 
summaries) to which I have had access. 
11 Utt 34.33 (C p. 244, L p. 221) / 34.1403 (B p. 288), 34.49-50 (C p. 245, L p. 222-23) 
/ 34.1419-20 (B p. 291), 34.54-55 (C p. 246, L p. 223) / 34.1424-25 (B p. 291). Cf. 
Ludwig Alsdorf, The Óryå Stanzas of the Uttarajhåyå. Contributions to the text history 
and interpretation of a canonical Jaina text, Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1966 (AAWL, Jg. 1966 
Nr. 2, pp. 153-220), p. 214 f. 
12 Utt 29.71 (C p. 211) / 29.72 (L p. 201) / 29.1173 (B p. 257), 29.73 (C p. 211) / 29.74 
(L p. 201) / 29.1175 (B p. 258).  
13 Utt 36.9 (C p. 250) / 36.9 (L p. 226) / 36.1461 (B p. 297). 
14 Èhåˆa 1.31 (B p. 4) / 1.41 (D p. 13, L p. 490): ege maˆe devåsuramaˆuyåˆaµ taµsi 
taµsi samayaµsi. 
15 Èhåˆa 1.36 (B p. 4) / 1.44.45 (D p. 16) / 1.48-50 (L p. 491): ege samae/ ege paese/ 
ege paramåˆË/. 
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16 Èhåˆa 3.2.173 (B p. 67) / 3.2.165 (D p. 90) / 3.2.328-335 (L p. 568): tato acchejjå 
pannattå, taµjahå: samaye, padese, paramåˆË/ evam abhejjå, a∂ajjhå, agijj˙å, aˆaddhå, 
amajjhå, apaeså, avibhåtimå/. 
17 Viy 5.8.5 (B p. 220-21) / 5.8.203 (L p. 224-25) / 5.8.144 (Lalw II p. 212); Jozef 
Deleu, Viyåhapannatti (Bhagava¥): The Fifth Anga of the Jaina Canon. Introduction, 
critical analysis, commentary & indexes, Brugge, 1970 (reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, 
Delhi, 1996 (Lala Sundar Lal Jain Research Series, 10)), p. 116. Note Jozef Deleu's 
("Lord Mahåv¥ra and the anyat¥rthikas," A. N. Upadhye et al. (eds.), Mahåv¥ra and His 
Teachings, Bhagavån Mahåv¥ra 2500th Nirvåˆa Mahotsava Samiti, Bombay, 1977, pp. 
187-193) observation to the extent that "the Buddhists have not been mentioned by 
name in the Viy[åhapannatti] and it is rather difficult to decide whether any of the 
dissident views exposed in that work may be pinned on them" (p. 191). 
18 Rospatt, The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness, p. 103 with note 233. 
19 Even without SËy I.1.1.17 it would be possible to argue that the theory of 
momentariness originated in Buddhism, on the basis of the structural development of 
Buddhist thought. SËy I.1.1.17 saves us the trouble of having to work out this argument 
here. 
20 SËy I.1.1.17 (ed. Bollée): anno aˆanno ˆ'evåhu heuyaµ ca aheuyaµ. Tr. Bollée, 
Studien zum SËyaga∂a I, p. 72. 
21 Hermann Jacobi, Jaina SËtras, translated from the Pråkrit, Part II: Uttarådhyayana 
SËtra, SËtrak®tå∫ga SËtra, Oxford University Press, 1895 (reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, 
Delhi, 1968) p. 238. 
22 Cp. on all this Bronkhorst, "Die Buddhistische Lehre," p. ??? f. 
23 Bareau, SBPV p. 114 f. 
24 Utt 36.11 (C p. 250, L p. 227) / 36.1463 (B p. 297); tr. Jacobi, Jaina SËtras II, p. 208, 
modified. 
25 E.g. Viy 2.10.11 (B p. 116) / 2.10.139 (L p. 118) / 2.10.66 (Lalw I p. 215): je rËv¥ 
[aj¥vå] te caüvvihå paˆˆattå, taµ jahå: khaµdhå, khaµdhadeså, khaµdhapadeså, 
paramåˆupoggalå, cf. Deleu, Viyåhapannatti, p. 94; Viy 5.7.1 f. (B p. 210 f.) / 5.7.150 f. 
(L p. 216 f.) / 5.7.109 f. (Lalw II p. 193 f.), cf. Deleu, Viyåhapannatti, p. 113 f. 
26 Viy 12.4.2 f. (B p. 572 f.) / 12.4.69 f. (L p. 552 f.), cf. Deleu, Viyåhapannatti, p. 183. 
27 Viy 12.10.28 f. (B p. 611 f.) / 12.10.218 f. (L p. 584 f.); Deleu, Viyåhapannatti, p. 
191-92. 
28 Padmanabh S. Jaini (The Jaina Path of Purification, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1979, 
p. 101) refers to the traditional explanation of this term ("The Jaina term pudgala is 
traditionally said to be derived from puµ- (joining) plus -gala (breaking)"), but this can 
no more be accepted as a historical explanation than the one offered in the 
Sarvadarßanasa∫graha (p. 72, ch. 3 l. 254): pËrayanti galant¥ti pudgalå˙. 
29 SËy I.13.571 (B p. 103) / I.13.15 (D p. 158; L p. 334; J). This may be the oldest [28] 
attestation of puggala/poggala in the Jaina canon. 
30 Jacobi, Jaina SËtras II, p. 322. 
31 IAMD s.v. poggala gives for this passage the meaning "soul". 
32 Óyåra II.1.1.10.404 (B p. 140) / II.1.10.58 (D, p. 236) / II.1.10.135 (L p. 115) / 
II.1.10.6 (J); the reading follows the Ladnun ed. Note that Óyåra II is considered to be 
younger than Óyåra I. 
33 None in Óyåra I; cp. Moriichi Yamazaki and Yumi Ousaka, Óyåra∫ga. Word Index 
and Reverse Word Index, ChËØ Academic Research Institute, Tokyo, 1996 (Philologica 
Asiatica, Monograph Series 8). 
34 Èhåˆa 2.3.73 (B p. 23) / 2.3.81 (D p. 42) / 2.3.220 (L p. 516): bhijjaµtåˆaµ ceva 
poggalåˆaµ sadduppåe siyå. 
35 Viy 5.8.205 (L p. 225) / 5.8.7 (B p. 221) / 5.8.144 (Lalw II p. 213); Deleu, 
Viyåhapannatti, p. 116. 
36 Èhåˆa 2.3.75 (B p. 24) / 2.3.82 (D p. 42) / 2.3.228-29 (L p. 517): duvihå poggalå 
paˆˆattå, paramåˆupoggalå ceva, ˆopoggalå ceva; duvihå poggalå paˆˆattå, taµ jahå: 
suhumå ceva, båyarå ceva. 
ABHIDHARMA AND JAINISM  16 
 
 
37 Dalsukh D. Malvania, "Beginnings of Jaina philosophy in the Ócårå∫ga," Klaus 
Bruhn and Albrecht Wezler (eds.), Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. 
Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1981 (ANISt, 23), pp. 
151-153, esp. 151. 
38 Óyåra I.5.6.176 (B p. 56-57) / I.5.6.170 (D, p. 153 f.) / I.5.6.4 (S p. 26) / I.5.6.127 f. 
(L p. 47): se na d¥he na hasse na va††e na taµse na caüraµse na parimaˆ∂ale na kiˆhe na 
n¥le na lohie na hålidde na sukkile na surabhi-gandhe na durabhi-gandhe na titte na 
ka∂ue na kasåe na ambile na mahure na kakkha∂e na maüe na garue na lahue na s¥e na 
uˆhe na niddhe na lukkhe na kåË na ruhe na sa∫ge na itth¥ na purise na annahå parinne 
sanne uvamå na vijjaï, arËv¥ sattå, apayassa payaµ n'atthi, se na sadde na rËve na 
gandhe na rase na phåse icc-eyåvanti. (the reading follows ed. Schubring). 
39 Tr. Jacobi, Jaina SËtras I, p. 52, emended as in Paul Dundas, The Jains, Routledge, 
London and New York, 1992 (The Library of Religious Beliefs and Practices), p. 38. 
40 Malvania, "Beginnings of Jaina philosophy in the Ócårå∫ga," p. 152. 
41 SËy II.1.649, 653 (B p. 130, 133) / II.1.16, 22 (L p. 351, 353) / II.1.9 (D p. 184-85) / 
II.1.15, 19 (Bollée, Studien zum SËyaga∂a I, p. 25-26; J): jesiµ taµ su-y-akkhåyaµ 
bhavaï, anno bhavaï j¥vo annaµ sar¥raµ, tamhå te evaµ no vippa∂iveenti: ayaµ åuso 
åyå d¥he tti vå hasse tti vå parimaˆ∂ale tti vå va††e tti vå taµse tti vå caüraµse tti vå 
åyaye tti vå chalaµse tti vå a††haµse tti vå kiˆhe tti vå ˆ¥le tti vå lohiyahålidde tti vå 
sukkile tti vå subbhigandhe tti vå dubbhigandhe tti vå [29] titte tti vå ka∂ue tti vå kasåe 
tti vå ambile tti vå mahure tti vå kakkha∂e tti vå maüe tti vå gurue tti vå lahue tti vå s¥e 
tti vå usiˆe tti vå niddhe tti vå lukkhe tti vå/ ... tti pa∂hame purisajåe tajj¥vatacchar¥rae 
tti åhie/. Tr. Jacobi, Jaina SËtras II, p. 340, 342. For a discussion of this difficult 
passage, see Bollée, Studien zum SËyaga∂a I, p. 143 f. 
42 Óyåra I.5.5.171 (B p. 55) / I.5.5.165 (D p. 151) / I.5.5.5 (S p. 25) / I.5.5.104 (L p. 
45): je åyå se vinnåyå, je vinnåyå se åyå, jeˆa vijåˆaï se åyå (the reading follows ed. 
Schubring). Tr. Dundas, The Jains, p. 38. 
43 Utt 14.19 (L p. 133; C p. 121; J) / 14.460 (B p. 150) is not clear in this respect, but 
suggests that the notion of a body-sized soul may not yet have existed at that time: 
"[The soul] cannot be apprehended by the senses, because it possesses no corporeal 
form, and since it possesses no corporeal form it is eternal. Its binding is determined 
because of the things connected with the soul, and this binding is called the cause of 
worldly existence" (no indiya-ggejjha amuttabhåvå, amuttabhåvå vi ya hoi nicco/ 
ajjhatthaheuµ niyay'assa bandho, saµsåraheuµ ca vayaµti bandhaµ//; tr. Jacobi, Jaina 
SËtras II, p. 64, modified in accordance with K.R. Norman, "Kriyåvåda and the 
existence of the soul," originally published in: Harish Chandra Das (ed.), Buddhism and 
Jainism, Part II, Cuttack, 1976, pp. 4-12, reprint: Collected Papers II, PTS, Oxford, 
1991, pp. 99-112, esp. p. 104 f.; "Uttarajjhayaˆa-sutta XIV: Usuyårijjaµ," Aspects of 
Jainology, Pt. Dalsukh Bhai Malvania Felicitation Volume, Vol. 3, Varanasi 1991, pp. 
16-26, reprint: Collected Papers III, PTS, Oxford, 1992, pp. 244-256, esp. p. 249 f. The 
reappearance of elements of this verse in later Jaina works such as the 
Paramåtmaprakåßa (Norman, "Kriyåvåda and the existence of the soul," p. 105 f.) will 
be dealt with in a future study. 
44 Utt 36.65 (C p. 255; J) / 36.64 (L p. 230) / 36.1516 (B p. 303): usseho jassa jo hoi 
bhavammi carimammi u/ tibhågahåˆå tatto ya siddhåˆogåhaˆå bhave//. Tr. Jacobi, Jaina 
SËtras II, p. 212, modified 
45 Viy 1.6.26 (B p. 48-49) / 1.6.312-13 (L p. 52) / 1.6.226-227 (Lalw I p. 98-99); cf. 
Deleu, Viyåhapannatti, p. 81 (1.6.6). 
46 Tr. E. Leumann, “Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur zu andern Literaturkreisen 
Indiens,” Actes du Sixième Congrès International des Orientalistes tenu en 1883 à 
Leyde, Troisième Partie, Section 2: Aryenne, E. J. Brill, Leyde, 1885, pp. 467-564, esp. 
p. 521. 
47 Viy 7.8.2 (B p. 301) / 7.8.158-159 (L p. 297-98) / 7.8.134 (Lalw III p. 62); cf. Deleu, 
Viyåhapannatti, p. 139.  
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48 Uvavåiya 171: d¥haµ vå hussaµ vå jaµ carima-bhave havejja saµ†håˆaµ, tatto ti-
bhåga-h¥ˆaµ siddhåˆ'ogåhaˆå bhaˆiyå. 
[30] 
49 The notion of a soul having the size of the thumb is not unknown to early Indian 
literature either; cp. Ka†hUp 4.12-13; 6.17; ÍAßUp 3.13; 5.8-9; Mhbh 3.281.16; 5.45.24 
(a∫gu∑†hamåtra puru∑a / j¥va). Note however that Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya distinguishes 
between a bodily self and an inner self: ßar¥råtmå tat karma karoti yenåntaråtmå 
sukhadu˙khe anubhavati (Mahå-bh II p. 68 l. 21-22, on P. 3.1.87 vt. 10). The view that 
early Vaiße∑ika accepted a body-sized soul is far from certain, and may indeed be 
mistaken; cp. Johannes Bronkhorst, "Studies on Bhart®hari, 5: Bhart®hari and 
Vaiße∑ika," AS 47(1), 1993, pp. 75-94, esp. p. 87 f. 
50 K.K. Dixit, Early Jainism, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1978 (L.D. Series, 
64), p. 9. Cp. Dundas, The Jains, p. 84: "The notion of karma as a substance pervading 
the universe and being attracted to the j¥va by the latter's actions was unknown to the 
earliest Jain teaching" (diacritics added). 
51 Utt 33.16-17 (L p. 218; J p. 194-95) / 33.1361-62 (B p. 283). 
52 Óyåra I.2.6.99 (B p. 29) / I.2.6.99 (D p. 95) / I.2.6.163 & 5.3.59 (L p. 27 & 43) / 
I.2.6.3 & 5.3.5 (S p. 12, 23; J): muˆ¥ moˆaµ samåyåya/°yåe dhuˆe kammasar¥ragaµ 
(the Bombay and Delhi editions have at the second occurrence of this line (I.5.3.161 (B 
p. 51) / I.5.3.155 (D p. 142)) sar¥ragaµ instead of kammasar¥ragaµ). Jacobi simply 
translated ‘body’: "A sage, acquiring sagedom, should subdue his body" or "A sage 
adopting a life of wisdom, should treat his body roughly". The Jaina tradition itself, by 
reading the second time sar¥raga (unacceptable for metrical reasons), appears to have 
accepted this interpretation. 
53 So Èhåˆa 5.1.23-31 (L p. 684) / 5.1.395 (B p. 175; D p. 196); Èhåˆa 6.11 (L p. 719) / 
6.483 (B p. 206; D p. 236); Sam 152 (B p. 457; D p. 94) / Prak¥rˆaka 158-171 (L p. 
934). 
54 Schubring, The Doctrine of the Jainas, p. 137. 
55 Viy 8.9.366 f. (L p. 376 f.) / 8.9.24 f. (B p. 383 f.) / 8.9.303 f. (Lalw III p. 242 f.); 
Deleu, Viyåhapannatti, p. 155-56. 
56 According to the Tattvårtha SËtra (2.42) two types of body — the karma body and 
the fiery body — accompany the soul from beginningless times, also between births. 
Interestingly, the Yoga Bhå∑ya on sËtra 4.10 (cp. Johannes Bronkhorst, "Patañjali and 
the Yoga sËtras," StII 10, 1984, 191-212, esp. p. 207) refers to "others" who ascribe a 
similar function to the mind-complex (citta). The fact that this mind-complex is said to 
have the size and the form of the body and is in this connection compared to a lamp 
which fills the space in which it is placed, just like the soul according to Viy 7.8 and the 
Råyapaseˆaïjja referred to above, suggests that this notion did not arise independently 
of the Jaina notion of the soul. 
 
 
